I. INTRODUCTION
In Horton v. California,' the United States Supreme Court held that inadvertent discovery is not required for a seizure of evidence under the plain view doctrine. 2 While supporting other limitations on the plain view doctrine, the Court concluded that the interests of law enforcement are better served without the inadvertency requirement.-In addition, the Court concluded that inadvertent discovery is not necessary for the protection of fourth amendment interests. 4 Examining Horton, this Note concludes that the Supreme Court's holding correctly balanced the needs of law enforcement and the interests protected by the fourth amendment. This Note reasons that whether defined subjectively or objectively, the inadvertency requirement imposes substantial costs on effective law enforcement. This Note also asserts that the inadvertency requirement furtherg no fourth amendment interest, as represented by the continued prohibition of general searches and seizures. Finally, this Note concludes that the Court's abolishment of the inadvertency requirement may permit abuse of the plain view doctrine through pretextual searches. However, concern over the limited possibility of pretextual activity is offset by the benefits created for law enforcement officials and the Court's continued protection of fourth amendment interests. The Horton Court thus correctly abolished the inadvertent discovery requirement.
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In Coolidge v. New Hampshire," the Supreme Court announced the parameters of the plain view doctrine. 1 2 To permit the seizure of evidence under the plain view doctrine, the Court required the following conditions: (1) the officers' "initial intrusion" or occupancy of the viewing area must be lawful; (2) the incriminating character of the evidence viewed must be "immediately apparent" to the officers; and (3) the officers' discovery of the evidence must be "inadvertent."' 3 Officers satisfy the first requirement if the entry to search is authorized by a warrant or one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement.' 4 The second requirement is satisfied if the officer has probable cause to believe that the items observed are contraband or evidence of a crime. 15 After Coolidge, however, debate continued over whether inadvertent discovery was necessary for a plain view seizure.' 6 Forty-six 11 403 U.S. 443 (plurality opinion). 12 Id. at 464-71 (plurality opinion). 13 Brown, 460 U.S. at 736-37 (plurality opinion) (summarizing the plain view doctrine after Coolidge) (citations omitted).
In Coolidge, officers acting under the authority of a warrant arrested the defendant and seized his automobile. 403 U.S. at 447-48 (plurality opinion). Subsequent searches of the car produced evidence used in the defendant's conviction. Id. at 448 (plurality opinion). On review, the Supreme Court invalidated the warrant because it had not been issued by a neutral judicial officer. The state then unsuccessfully argued that despite the invalid warrant, the search of the automobile was lawful under the plain view doctrine. Id. at 453, 464-73 (plurality opinion). In the plurality opinion in which Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall joined, Justice Stewart established the conditions necessary for a plain view seizure, stating:
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification.. . and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. Id. at 466 (plurality opinion).
The Court held the search in Coolidge was not "inadvertent" because "the police had ample opportunity to obtain a valid warrant; they knew the automobile's exact description and location well in advance; [and] 19 Justice White noted that the inadvertent discovery requirement still had not been adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court. 20 In Horton, a majority of the Court finally agreed on the necessity of the inadvertent discovery requirement.
2 1
III. FACTS OF THE CASE
Returning home from the San Jose Coin Club's annual coin show on January 13, 1985, Erwin Paul Wallaker found two masked men in his garage. 2 2 One man carried a machine gun, and the other brandished an electrical shocking device known as a "stun gun.''23 The two men bound Wallaker and robbed him of the cash entrusted to him as the coin club's treasurer. 24 The men also took collector coins, jewelry, and three rings from Wallaker's fingers. 25 
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PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE geant Gary LaRault, an experienced police officer, believed he had probable cause to search Horton's residence for both the robbery proceeds and the weapons used. 2 9 His affidavit requesting a warrant to search Horton's residence included a police report describing both the robbery proceeds and weapons. 3 0 The magistrate, however, issued a warrant authorizing a search only for the proceeds, including the three particularly described rings. On January 30, 1985, Sergeant LaRault searched Horton's house without finding the stolen rings or other robbery proceeds. 3 2 During the search, LaRault observed in plain view several weapons described in the police report. 3 3 He seized "an Uzi machine gun, a .38 caliber revolver, two stun guns, a handcuff key, a San Jose Coin Club advertising brochure, and a few items of clothing described by [Wallaker] ." 3 4 The evidence seized was not discovered "inadvertently" because LaRault testified that he was searching not only for the robbery proceeds described in the warrant, but also for other evidence associated with the crime. 3 5 Denying Horton's motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search of his home, the trial court convicted Horton of armed robbery. 3 Affirming the California Appellate Court decision, the United States Supreme Court held that inadvertent discovery was not necessary for the warrantless seizure of evidence under the plain view doctrine. 42 Writing for the majority, 43 Justice Stevens concluded that two flaws existed in the plurality opinion that established the plain view doctrine's inadvertent discovery requirement. 44 First, Justice Stevens reasoned that search and seizure rules based on the objective rather than the subjective state of mind of the officer better served the purposes of law enforcement. 45 Second, Justice Stevens viewed the fourth amendment's underlying purpose of preventing general searches as not mandating the plain view doctrine's inadvertent discovery requirement. 
Application of Ob'ective Standards
The Court concluded that the subjective intentions of a police officer should not affect the propriety of a search under the plain view doctrine. 47 The fact that a police officer anticipates finding evidence that is not included in the list of items specifically described in the search warrant should not invalidate the seizure of the evidence. 48 Because additional items would only expand the area he or she may lawfully search, the Court concluded that a police officer has no motivation to omit items for which he or she believes he or she has probable cause to search. 49 Only a mistake or oversight could explain an officer's failure to include such items in a In support of this reasoning, the majority referred to an example given by Justice White in his dissent in Coolidge. 51 In this example, Justice White asked the reader to suppose that officers obtained a warrant to search for a rifle.
5 2 While limiting their search to areas where a rifle might be found, the officers observed, in plain view, two photographs. 5 3 Justice White further asked the reader to suppose that the officers inadvertently found one photograph, but anticipated finding the other.M Justice White asserted that if the Court held inadvertent discovery to be a requirement for search and seizure under the plain view doctrine, then only one of the photographs could be seized. 55 However, Justice White concluded that in terms of the fourth amendment, the possessory right interfered with is the same if either photograph is seized. 3 6 The officers' judgment regarding the possibility of finding the first photograph is no more reliable than their judgment concerning the second photograph. 5 7 In addition, the danger of losing the evidence remains the same to each photograph if the officers must leave the premises to secure another warrant. 58
General Warrants Remain Unconstitutional
The Court further concluded that abolishing the plain view doctrine's inadvertent discovery requirement would not convert specific warrants to general warrants. 59 Justice Stevens recognized that for a magistrate to issue a warrant, the fourth amendment required that the warrant "particularly describ[es] the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." 60 He argued that, by itself, this requirement sufficiently limited the scope and duration of the search. 6 ' Requiring that the evidence seized in plain view be discovered inadvertently served no further purpose. 
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As applied to the present case, the Court found that the officers limited their search of Horton's residence to areas in which the three rings and other items included in the warrant could have been found. 63 If the rings and other items included in the warrant had been found immediately, the search would have concluded and no general search for weapons could have taken place. 64 The Court also reasoned that the inadvertent discovery requirement did not further the fourth amendment's purpose of protecting privacy rights. 65 The Court stated that the privacy interest was infringed when the items came into plain view during a search, whether or not the police anticipated seeing the items. 66 Once the suspect's privacy was invaded through the issuance of a warrant defining the scope of the search, inadvertent discovery should not be a requirement for the seizure of items subsequently found. 67 In the present case, the Court concluded that Horton's privacy and possessory rights were not violated, because the search was authorized by the warrant and the seizure was authorized under the plain view doctrine.
68
B. THE DISSENTING OPINION
Writing in dissent, 6 9 Justice Brennan supported the position advanced by Justice Stewart in Coolidge. 70 Relying heavily on the language of the fourth amendment, Justice Brennan asserted that the fourth amendment was designed to protect equally the interests of privacy and possession. 7 1 Justice Brennan reasoned that the fourth amendment protected these interests by requiring a magistrate to determine the area to be searched and the items to be seized. 72 Justice Brennan concluded that the possessory interests were better protected by the magistrate than by officers in the performance of their duties. 73 He stated that just as the search of an area without a warrant was per se unreasonable, the seizure of items without a warrant was also per se unreasonable. 7 4
Justice Brennan stated that in order to avoid the inconvenience of obtaining a warrant for newly discovered evidence, the plain view doctrine allowed the seizure of evidence not described particularly in the original warrant. 75 However, the rationale of avoiding the inconvenience of obtaining another warrant was not present when the officers anticipated finding the evidence, and thus the inadvertent discovery requirement should be upheld. 76 Justice Brennan further noted the wide acceptance by state courts and law enforcement agencies of the inadvertent discovery requirement. 77 Justice Brennan then addressed what the majority believed were two flaws in the inadvertent discovery requirement of the plain view doctrine. 78 Justice Brennan concluded that possessory interests were invaded whenever an officer had probable cause to obtain a warrant, but seized items without obtaining the warrant. 7 9 By requiring seizure of items in plain view to be inadvertent, the officers would be more diligent in obtaining search warrants. 8 0 Justice Brennan also concluded that without the inadvertency requirement, officers would attempt to avoid the often time-consuming warrant application process. 8 ' For example, an officer having probable cause to search for a large number of items may obtain a warrant only for a few items. 8 2 Justice Brennan argued that the officer rationally may find the risk of immediately finding the items on the warrant and having to conclude his or her search outweighed by the time saved in the warrant application process. Justice Brennan also disagreed with the majority's assertion that because the scope and duration of the search was limited by the items specified in the warrant, no additional interest was protected by the inadvertent discovery requirement. 8 4 While conceding that the inadvertency requirement furthered no privacy interest, Justice Brennan concluded that it did protect possessory interests. 8 
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW item. 86 Finally, Justice Brennan concluded that the majority's decision would have limited impact and did not extend to permit pretextual searches. 8 7 Justice Brennan reasoned that officers should not be able to deliberately avoid the fourth amendment warrant requirements by obtaining a warrant to search for items from one crime, with the intention of seizing items in plain view from another crime, or using the "hot pursuit" exception to the warrant requirement to seize items in plain view. 88 Justice Brennan supported this point by noting that the state courts which had rejected the inadvertent discovery requirement had not held the fourth amendment to allow pretextual searches. 8 9
V. ANALYSIS
The resolution of fourth amendment issues requires the striking of a balance between the need for effective law enforcement and the need for protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court in Horton properly balanced these interests by eliminating the plain view doctrine's cumbersome and unnecessary inadvertent discovery requirement. In so doing, the Court advanced the interests of effective law enforcement by eliminating a confusing, impossible to define standard. More importantly, the Court's elimination of the inadvertent discovery requirement does not diminish the fourth amendment's purpose of protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures. One could argue that the abolition of the inadvertency requirement by Horton allows abuse of the plain view doctrine through pretextual searches. However, the possibility of abuse is severely limited by the plain view doctrine's other requirements. Thus, the Court correctly abolished the inadvertent discovery requirement to the plain view doctrine.
A. THE POSITIVE EFFECT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
In announcing the inadvertent discovery requirement to the plain view doctrine in 
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PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE 829 level of expectation on the part of the seizing officer constitutes "inadvertency." 9 0 While the majority of courts accepted the inadvertency requirement, 9 ' judges and commentators continued to struggle over whether the level of expectation necessary for inadvertency should be defined by the subjective mind of the officer or by the existence of objective probable cause. 9 2 In Horton, Justice Stevens correctly concluded that the elimination of the inadvertent discovery requirement to the plain view doctrine would facilitate fair law enforcement. 93 While he demonstrated the costs imposed on law enforcement by a subjective standard, Justice Stevens failed to address the effects of applying an objective standard of inadvertency. 94 However, whether defined subjectively or objectively, the 90 The "most serious problem with the plurality's approach to plain view is thatJustice Stewart nowhere defined the degree of expectation required to make a discovery by the police inadvertent. In establishing the inadvertent discovery requirement, Justice Stewart stated: The rationale of the exception to the warrant requirement.., is that a plain-view seizure will not turn an initially valid (and therefore limited) search into a "general" one, while the inconvenience of procuring a warrant to cover an inadvertent discovery is great. But where the discovery is anticipated, where police know in advance the location of the evidence and intend to seize it, the situation is altogether different. The requirement of a warrant to seize imposes no inconvenience whatever, or at least none which is constitutionally cognizable in a legal system that regards warrantless searches as 'per se unreasonable' in the absence of'exigent circumstances.' Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 469-71 (1971) (plurality opinion).
91 The appendices to Horton provide a complete list of courts accepting the inadvertent discovery requirement. 110 S. Ct. at 2314-16.
One commentator offered two possible interpretations of the inadvertency standard announced by Justice Stewart in Coolidge:
If the Rule is taken to mean that a plain-view discovery will be held invalid, because not inadvertent, only when the police have probable cause to believe that the evidence would be found, it will be of limited effect.... The inadvertence requirement will be far more significant if it is interpreted as requiring the invalidation of discoveries when the police have an expectation that evidence will be discovered on the premises but lack probable cause to search. 94 Justice Stevens concluded that, "evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend on the subjective state of mind of the officer." Id. at 2308-09. However, in demonstrating the problems associated with the inadvertent discovery requirement, Justice Stevens failed to state clearly if the same problems would result from the application of an objective probable cause standard of inadvertency. Justice Stevens appears to address the subjective mind of the officer in stating:
if he or she has a valid warrant to search for one item and merely a suspicion concerning the second, whether or not it amounts to probable cause, we fail to see, why SUPREME COURT REVIEW inadvertent discovery requirement imposes substantial costs on law enforcement, and thus was correctly abolished. The Court in Horton correctly refused to apply a subjective standard of inadvertency. The subjective approach to inadvertency allows the admission of evidence seized under the plain view doctrine if the officer did not either anticipate or subjectively possess probable cause to search for the item. This approach imposes intolerable costs on law enforcement by arbitrarily excluding evidence, penalizing officers for not seeking broader warrants, and creating further evidentiary problems at trial.
Justice Stevens effectively demonstrated the subjective standard's arbitrary exclusion of evidence through an example given by Justice White in Coolidge. 9 5 Suppose while searching for a rifle listed in the warrant, an officer finds two incriminating photographs. If the officer anticipated finding one photograph and not the other, under a subjective standard of inadvertency the officer could seize only the photograph he or she did not anticipate finding. However, the danger to the evidence and the inconvenience to law enforcement are equal if an officer must obtain another warrant for seizure. The subjective standard of inadvertency undermines effective law enforcement by arbitrarily excluding incriminating evidence.
Furthermore, the subjective standard actually penalizes officers who seek narrow warrants. For example, suppose an officer believes probable cause exists to search for an item, but in good faith decides not to include the item in his or her request for a warrant because he or she is unsure of the likelihood of finding the item. If later found in plain view during the course of the search, the item is excluded because the officer anticipated its discovery. Thus, under the subjective standard, incriminating evidence is suppressed when an officer requests a narrow warrant in an effort to limit the invasiveness of the search.
Finally, an application of the subjective standard of inadvertency causes problems in evidentiary hearings. An officer's degree of expectation that evidence will be found can vary from a "hunch" to "practical certainty." In attempting to determine whether an ofthat suspicion should immunize the second item from seizure if it is found during a lawful search for the first. Id. at 2309. Also, Justice White's example in Coolidge, which is referred to by Justice Stevens, appears to address the subjective mind of the officer. Id. at 2309 (citing Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 516 (White, J., dissenting)). In distinguishing between two photographs, Justice White asks the reader to "assume also that the discovery of one photograph was inadvertent but the finding of the other was anticipated." Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 516 (White, J., dissenting).
95 Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2309 (citing Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 517 (White, J., dissenting)).
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ficer anticipated or subjectively possessed probable cause, a court effectively would be trying to label a concept that is impossible to define. Litigation would arise over the credibility of the officer's testimony that he or she did not believe probable cause existed to search for the items seized under the plain view doctrine. Furthermore, if multiple officers were involved in the search, issues would be raised over which officer's beliefs should be determinative.
96
The application of an objective probable cause standard of inadvertency also imposes substantial burdens on law enforcement. For discovery to be sufficiently inadvertent to authorize a plain view seizure under the objective standard, probable cause must not objectively exist to search for items not listed on the warrant for seizure. The more accepted and reasonable view of Coolidge applies this objective definition of inadvertency. 97 Under Coolidge, when the evidence in plain view is not inadvertently discovered, the evidence is left vulnerable to disturbance while the officer returns for a warrant to seize the evidence. The most reasonable explanation for such a result is that probable cause must have objectively existed to search for the unlisted items, and thus the officer could have obtained a warrant for these items before commencing the search. However, if the officer only subjectively believed probable cause existed, a warrant could not have been obtained before the search commenced; thus, the evidence should not remain in danger of disturbance while the warrant is obtained. 98 While at first glance an 96 The Solicitor General pointed out several problems caused by the "subjective probable cause" test.
First, in a case involving several officers, it would raise a question of which officer's subjective beliefs should be consulted. Second, it would likely give rise to litigation over the bona fides of the officer's testimony as to his beliefs, as well as challenges to the reasonableness of those beliefs. Third, it would still penalize the cautious officer who, while believing that he had probable cause to search for particular items, decided not to request authorization to search for those items because he regarded the likelihood that those items would be found on the premises to present a close question. If the 'inadvertent discovery' limitation is to make any sense at all, however, it must at least mean that a discovery of objects not named in the warrant is always inadver-832 SUPREME COURT REVIEW [Vol. 81 objective standard of inadvertency appears reasonable, the application of the objective standard also imposes substantial costs on law enforcement. It suppresses evidence because of mistake or oversight, penalizes officers who do not request broad warrants, and creates evidentiary problems at trial. First, Justice Stevens pointed out that the objective inadvertent discovery requirement suppresses evidence because of mistake or oversight. Justice Stevens reasoned that an officer with probable cause to search for an item possessed no motivation for omitting that item from his or her search warrant request. 9 9 If probable cause to search for an item objectively existed, upon application by an officer, the item would be included in the warrant. The probable explanation for the failure to include such an item was either the officer's mistake in recognizing that probable cause existed to search for the item or an oversight in the warrant application process. 1 0 0 However, under the objective standard of inadvertency, the evidence is excluded because probable cause did exist to search for the item. Thus, the objective standard of inadvertency causes a severe injustice by suppressing incriminating evidence as a result of mistake or oversight.' 0 l In HortonJustice Brennan disagreed withJustice Stevens on the deterrent effect of the inadvertency requirement on unreasonable searches and seizures. 10 2 Justice Brennan argued that absent the inadvertent discovery requirement, officers would be motivated to tent, without regard to the personal hopes or expectations of the executing officers, if there were not sufficient grounds to justify the issuance of a warrant which also named those objects which must be seized. In light of the fact thatJustice Stewart is not prepared to require the police to return to the magistrate for a second warrant when the discovery was 'inadvertent,' the only plausible explanation for requiring such action in the remaining cases (without regard to the risk that the evidence may be lost in the interim) is because the police could have (and thus, apparently, should have) included the discovered object in the first warrant. If the police have probable cause to search for a photograph as well as a rifle and they proceed to seek a warrant, they could have no possible motive for deliberately including the rifle but omitting the photograph. Quite the contrary is true. Only oversight or careless mistake would explain the omission in the warrant application if the police were convinced they had probable cause to search for the photograph. 403 U.S. at 517 (White, J., dissenting).
101 One commentator has asserted that courts often do not exclude evidence which was not listed in a warrant because of a mistake or oversight. Instead, courts "regularly characterize as 'inadvertent' the discovery of items as to which it appears the police could have made a probable cause showing in advance had it occurred to them to do so." W. LAFAvE, supra note 92, § 4.11(d), at 354-55 (footnote omitted).
102 Horton, I10 S. Ct. at 2312-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
omit from a warrant items which they had probable cause to search for in order to avoid an often time-consuming warrant process.
1 0 3
However, while in some circumstances the officers could be motivated to avoid a time-consuming warrant process, as later discussed, Justice Brennan failed to demonstrate the diminishing of any fourth amendment interest.
1 04
The objective standard of inadvertency also penalizes officers for requesting authority for an intrusion narrower in scope than the constitutional limits. For example, suppose an officer subjectively believes that probable cause does not exist to search for an item, and thus does not include the item in his or her warrant request. While searching for items in a warrant, the officer observes the unlisted item in plain view and seizes it. Under the objective standard of inadvertency, if the court later determines that probable cause existed to search for the unlisted item, then the evidence is excluded.
Thus, under the objective standard of inadvertency, officers would be more likely to name more items in their warrant requests, because if probable cause is later found for a seized, but unlisted item, it will be excluded. By naming numerous items in a request, the warrant process becomes more and more complicated and timeconsuming. In addition, the scope of the search is expanded to include places where the additional items may be located, resulting in further invasion of the suspect's privacy. Thus, the objective standard of inadvertency penalizes an officer for avoiding warrants which expand the search to the outer constitutional limits.
Finally, the objective probable cause standard for inadvertency causes evidentiary problems in exclusionary hearings.1 0 5 Under this standard, officers in effect argue that probable cause did not exist for items not included in the warrant but seized under the plain view doctrine. At the same time, the defendant argues that the officers had probable cause and a warrant could have been obtained. By encouraging officers to suppress facts which would result in a finding of objective probable cause, the objective probable cause standard for inadvertency fails to encourage an accurate fact-finding process. The preceding examination of the practical effects of both the subjective and objective definitions of inadvertency exhibits the re- 
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW quirement's inherent costs on the law enforcement process. The abolition of the inadvertent discovery requirement eliminates arbitrary exclusion of evidence, the suppression of incriminating evidence because of mistake or oversight, the penalizing of law enforcement officers for requesting narrow warrants, and inaccurate fact-finding in evidentiary hearings. Thus, in Horton, Justice Stevens correctly assessed these costs, and by eliminating the inadvertency requirement to the plain view doctrine, removed an unnecessary burden on effective law enforcement.
B. QUIETING THE CONCERN FOR A DIMINISHED FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Court's abolition of the plain view doctrine's inadvertent discovery requirement in Horton raises concern over the fourth amendment's prohibition of general searches and seizures. 10 7 By requiring that a warrant specify the place to be searched, the fourth amendment protects privacy interests. Similarly, the fourth amendment protects possessory interests by requiring that a warrant specifically describe the items to be seized. l0 8 In Horton,Justice Stevens correctly concluded that the plain view doctrine without the inadvertency requirement protected fourth amendment interests through the continued prohibition of general searches.' 0 9 Justice Stevens effectively demonstrated that the inadvertency requirement was not necessary to protect privacy interests, although he failed to sufficiently address the effect of the inadvertency requirement on possessory interests. Nevertheless, an examination of the plain view doctrine reveals that the inadvertency requirement does not further any privacy or possessory interest. Thus, in Horton, the Court correctly abolished this unneeded limitation on the plain view doctrine.
As pointed out by Justice Stevens" l0 and conceded by Justice 
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Brennan,"'I the inadvertency requirement provides no protection of privacy interests. 12 As Justice Stevens demonstrated, privacy interests are protected by other limitations on the scope of a plain view search. Under the plain view doctrine, a warrant specifically describing the place to be searched and the items to be seized authorizes the invasion of privacy. 1 1 3 The scope of the invasion or search is limited to areas where the items listed in the warrant could be found, and the search must conclude upon the location of the listed items. 1 1 4 If, during the course of the search, officers observe an item not listed in the warrant, no further privacy interest is invaded through its seizure. 1 5 For example, in Horton, the search was limited to areas in which the robbery proceeds could be located and, upon location of the robbery proceeds, the search would conclude. After the officers entered Horton's home under a warrant to search for the robbery proceeds, no further privacy interest was invaded by the officer's observation of the robbery weapons.
In establishing the plain view doctrine in Coolidge, Justice Stewart recognized an invasion of possessory interests by plain view seizures, but concluded the interests of law enforcement outweighed this "minor peril to Fourth Amendment protections ...
"116
Justice Stewart adopted the inadvertency requirement to prevent any further invasion of possessory interests through general searches.' 17 In Horton, Justice Brennan correctly argued that the Court abolished the inadvertency requirement without discussing the impact on possessory interests. 118 However, both Justice Stew-111 "It is true that the inadvertent discovery requirement furthers no privacy interests." Id. at 2313 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 112 On the other hand, as the Solicitor General argued, the inadvertent discovery requirement could actually lead to greater invasions of privacy. Under the inadvertency rule, after observing incriminating evidence not listed in a warrant, officers would be forced to remain on the premises until a warrant for the discovered items was obtained. Thus, the officers stay is extended and the invasion of privacy increased. Solicitor General's Brief, supra note 96, at 19-20. 113 Exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as an arrest, also authorize the invasion of privacy. See supra note 9 for a list of exceptions to the warrant requirement.
114 In the case of arrest, officers are limited to the areas in which the suspect could be located, and the search terminates on his or her location. 118 "The Court today eliminates a rule designed to further possessory interests on the ground that it fails to further privacy interests." Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2313 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
